Pearl Harbor - The New York Times


pearl harbor articles

Aug 01,  · News about Pearl Harbor. Commentary and archival information about Pearl Harbor from The New York Times. no longer supports Internet Explorer 9 or earlier. The Politics of Surprise The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor has often been referred to as a surprise attack. In reality, the Japanese opening of war on the United States, Great Britain and Holland, was not even remotely surprising to Allied high command. On the morning of December 7, , Japan attacked the US naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The surprise attack by some Japanese aircraft sunk or badly damaged eighteen US naval vessels, including eight battleships, destroyed or damaged US aircraft, and killed 2, men.

Pearl Harbor, December 7,

View looking up Battleship Row, after the Japanese attack. On December 8, President Franklin D. On the southern end of Oahu, Pearl Harbor held a 22, acre naval base. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel of the Navy and Lt. General Walter C. Short of the Army were in command of the fleet and troops on the ground, respectively. Unless a new source of oil was opened, the Imperial Japanese Navy would be in dry dock within a year and Japanese industries would grind to a halt in 12—18 months, pearl harbor articles.

A plan was developed to cripple the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor to allow time for Japan to seize the resource areas it needed and fortify them to the point that retaking them would cost more lives than the Imperial High Command thought Americans would be willing to pay. Yamamoto had studied in the United States.

He knew his nation lacked the ability to defeat the much larger, resource-and industry-rich country and did not share the opinion of many Japanese officers that the Americans were too weak-willed to fight.

The attack on Pearl Harbor, which was influenced by the successful British attack that used carrier aircraft against the Italian fleet at Taranto, Italy the previous year, was essentially a last best-hope for Japanese success in the Pacific.

Early in the morning on December 7, more than Japanese planes attacked about 33 American ships on orders of Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo. America sustained a loss of nearly aircraft destroyed and damaged that morning, as well pearl harbor articles three ships destroyed and 16 damaged. Three thousand seven hundred Americans lost their lives, including 68 civilians. The cost to the Japanese was 29 aircraft, five midget submarines, and service personnel, all but one of whom was killed in action.

Commemorating the 1, crewman who lost their lives in the attack on Pearl Harbor, it s a tribute to World War II valor in the Pacific. Learn more about the Pearl Harbor Memorial. In a Photograph taken aboard a Japanese carrier before the attack, A Nakajima B5N "Kate" torpedo bomber is cheered on by the carrier's crew.

National Archives. Pacific Fleet. In just 90 minutes, the Japanese pearl harbor articles inflicted a devastating blow: five battleships were sunk, three battleships, three cruisers, and three destroyers were damaged, and nearly pearl harbor articles were destroyed. The most devastating loss was the 2, Americans killed and 1, wounded. Michael Slackman, a consulting historian to the U.

Yet a detailed examination of the preparation and execution of the attack on the Pacific Fleet reveals a much different story. Even after 10 months of arduous planning, rehearsal, and intelligence gathering, the attack was plagued by inflexibility, a lack of coordination, and misallocated resources. A plan for a likely contingency was cobbled together by three midgrade officers while en route to Hawaii.

The attack itself suffered significant command blunders, pearl harbor articles. Though armed with enough firepower to destroy up to 14 battleships and aircraft carriers, the Japanese landed killing hits on only three battleships; luck, combined with American damage control mistakes, added two more battleships to their tally. Not only was the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor far from brilliant, it also narrowly avoided disaster.

The Japanese Naval General Staff wanted to sink battleships, too, but for a different reason: they calculated from pearl harbor articles faulty initial assumptions that crippling four of the eight battleships in port would prevent the Pacific Fleet from sailing to relieve the Philippines for six months, allowing the Japanese to secure the flank of their pearl harbor articles advance.

The aviators involved had other target priorities. While a student at the Naval Staff College, he had called for the Imperial Navy to scrap all battleships and build only carriers.

When assigned in early to plan an attack to sink battleships at Pearl Harbor, he instead plotted to aim the bulk of the attack at any carriers that might be in port. His fixation would come close to disrupting the entire attack.

According to the Japanese Official History, they were to pearl harbor articles attack four designated battleships, then shift their attention to carriers.

After crippling or sinking these ships, the attack would shift to the remaining battleships, then shift again to cruisers. It was an overly complex, impossible scheme, likely constructed merely to brief the admirals, who were largely ignorant of aviation tactics and would not know that such an orderly progression through the targets was unworkable, pearl harbor articles.

Genda and the planners were well aware that the torpedo bombers had to fly low and slow as they approached their targets, making them extremely vulnerable to antiaircraft fire. The plan they intended to use split 90 Kates between two roles: torpedo and level bombing.

Genda then divided the 40 acting as torpedo bombers into four formations, pearl harbor articles. They were to travel together to a point north of Pearl Harbor, where 16 torpedo bombers in two formations would separate to approach from the west and attack the carrier moorings, while 24 torpedo bombers in two formations would attack Battleship Row from the east.

Immediately after, 50 more Kates acting as level bombers would attack from high altitude, pearl harbor articles, dropping massive 1,pound armor-piercing bombs on the battleships sheltered from torpedo fire by other ships or dry docks. Pearl harbor articles plan emphasized surprise; all 40 torpedo bombers could deliver their attacks in less than 90 seconds, before the enemy defenses could respond, pearl harbor articles.

It would be impossible for the torpedo bomber aircrews to methodically ratchet through a complicated target prioritization scheme pearl harbor articles they would pearl harbor articles be in a position to observe or evaluate the attacks of the aircraft that went before them.

Each aircrew could only do their best to identify a good target, launch a torpedo, and get out pearl harbor articles quickly as possible, pearl harbor articles. They pearl harbor articles to stay on those targets, even if the carriers had been sunk or capsized by the torpedo bombers.

Genda, true to his philosophy, assigned twice as many torpedo bombers per pearl harbor articles than per battleship, despite the fact that pearl harbor articles hits would sink a carrier. In other words, he allocated more than enough firepower to sink the carriers, but sent only enough firepower to cripple the battleships. He wanted to guarantee the carriers would never be salvaged, pearl harbor articles. They grounded their hopes that their smaller navy would prevail through better tactics, better weapons, and better training.

Realism, not safety precautions, drove their intensive preparations. Destroyers practiced torpedo attacks at night and in poor weather at high speed, resulting in some catastrophic collisions, pearl harbor articles.

Night bombing attacks were practiced while searchlights dazzled the pilots, pearl harbor articles, resulting in midair collisions. The cost in airplanes and lives was deemed acceptable. Yet the attack on Pearl Harbor went forward without a realistic dress rehearsal.

Each mission type—dive-bomber, level bomber, torpedo bomber, and fighter—trained independently. The Japanese simply did not practice combined arms doctrine, which utilizes different types of units in complementary ways to achieve an pearl harbor articles. The torpedo bombers apparently did not even employ the attack formation they would later use. On top of all that, they repeatedly concentrated on the easiest targets; no corrective action was taken.

Pearl harbor articles Planning Neglects a Likely Contingency On the eve of their departure, the planners realized that everything they had devised and practiced was based on achieving surprise.

What if the Americans were alert? This last-minute change held the spark of chaos. It was formulated without any flag officer or senior staff captain present; Genda and Fuchida were probably embarrassed that they had neglected such an obvious contingency. Murata objected to the plan, unwilling to risk his vulnerable torpedo pearl harbor articles against an awakened defense, but was overruled.

Reflecting the lack of a combined arms approach, the new plan was cemented without input from the fighter or dive-bomber leaders. Another key contingency emerged at the last minute—and was ignored. The day before the strike, Japanese intelligence reported that there were no carriers in Pearl Harbor.

Genda could have redirected the attack to focus on battleships and cruisers. However, a staff officer expressed hope that the carriers might return in the few hours remaining before the attack. After the massed formation cleared the clouds, he made no attempt to regain the planned track, pearl harbor articles. When the fighters did not take up their assigned positions, however, he assumed they had missed the signal and fired another—without considering that the observers might take this as the two-flare signal.

He groaned as the dive-bomber leader, believing that surprise had been lost, raced ahead of the torpedo bombers to make his diversionary attack. The dive-bombers arrived first, without climbing to standard bombing altitude, pearl harbor articles reduced the accuracy of their attacks. Their bombs, exploding on Ford Island and Hickam Field, pearl harbor articles American defenders aboard ships in the harbor.

Because the attack groups split up west rather than north of the harbor, the torpedo bombers assigned to strike the carrier moorings commenced their attack about five minutes before their counterparts assigned to Pearl harbor articles Row.

As a result, the first torpedo bomber to attack a battleship was met with heavy fire. It proved a poor choice. Pilots lost sight of their leaders, or even the aircraft ahead, and had to gain altitude and circle to get their bearings. Some broke away from their formation leader and attacked independently. There were mistakes, aborted runs, misidentified targets, and at least one near collision that forced a bomber to jettison its torpedo. At this point, Japanese fighters had detached to strafe nearby airfields.

Had American fighters been aloft over the harbor, instead of grounded by communication issues, the scattered torpedo bombers could easily have been slaughtered. With no carriers in port, nearly half the torpedo pearl harbor articles fell into disarray over which ships to target.

Six torpedo bombers misidentified the demilitarized battleship Utah as a frontline battleship and attacked, scoring only two hits. One torpedo missed Utah so badly it hit the light cruiser Raleigh pearl harbor articles an adjacent berth. Considering that this first wave was unopposed by enemy fighters and flew the easiest approach—similar to rehearsals, when 83 percent of the torpedo bombers hit their targets—it was a miserable performance. The remaining 10 bombers in the carrier attack group swung south of Ford Island looking for battleships; none of the aviators wanted to come home from the most important battle in Japanese history to say they had attacked a secondary target.

Five misidentified the backlit silhouette of the old minelayer Oglala, moored outboard of the light cruiser Helena, pearl harbor articles, as a battleship; only one torpedo hit. In all, 11 of the 16 torpedoes from the group assigned to attack carriers—more than a quarter of the 40 torpedoes in the entire attack—were launched at misidentified targets. All were desperate to drop their torpedoes before the defending antiaircraft fire became more intense and, just as in rehearsals, aimed mostly at the easiest targets—the battleships Oklahoma and West Virginia.

Of the 19 total torpedo hits, these two battleships absorbed 12—nearly two-thirds of the hits. Four of these were overkill, wasted torpedoes that would have been more effective against the battleships California, which received only two hits, and Nevada, which received just one. Only 11 torpedo hits were against properly identified targets that were part of the objective; pearl harbor articles score rises to 13 if the accidental hits on the cruisers Raleigh and Helena are included.

Thus, at best 33 percent of the torpedoes brought to the battle were effective—far short of the 67 percent Genda had expected. Just before the 81 second-wave dive-bombers launched, the pilots were informed that the American pearl harbor articles were not in port, pearl harbor articles.

Rather than turning their focus to the secondary targets—cruisers—word was circulated that they were to finish off ships damaged in the first attack. Many of the pilots took this vague declaration as an order to strike battleships, pearl harbor articles, despite the known ineffectiveness of their general-purpose bombs in this role. While the second wave approached the harbor, pearl harbor articles, Fuchida—after dropping his armor-piercing bomb a miss —spent 30 minutes circling the harbor.


Pearl Harbor - HISTORY


pearl harbor articles


The Politics of Surprise The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor has often been referred to as a surprise attack. In reality, the Japanese opening of war on the United States, Great Britain and Holland, was not even remotely surprising to Allied high command. Pearl Harbor attack. Written By: Pearl Harbor attack, (December 7, ), surprise aerial attack on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor on Oahu Island, Hawaii, by the Japanese that precipitated the entry of the United States into World War II. The strike climaxed a decade of worsening relations between the United States and Japan. On December 7, , Japan staged a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, decimating the US Pacific Fleet. When Germany and Italy declared war on the United States days later, America found itself in a global war. The Roots of the Conflict. While Japan’s deadly assault on Pearl Harbor stunned Americans, its roots stretched back more than four Michal.